TOC 

The thinking process of lectures --The steps of thinking of lectures 
A The first stage of phenomenological consideration 
B The second stage of phenomenological consideration

C Three stages of phenomenological consideration


LECTURE I
1 The natural attitude in thinking and science of the natural sort
2 The philosophic (reflective) attitude in thinking
3 The contradictions of reflection on cognition, when one reflects in the natural attitude
4 The dual task of true criticism of cognition

5 True criticism of cognition as phenomenology of cognition
6 The new dimension belonging to philosophy; its peculiar method in contrast to science


LECTURE II
1 The beginning of the critique of cognition Treating as questionable every knowing
2 Reaching the ground of absolute certainty in pursuance of Descartesf method of doubt
3 The things that are absolutely given
4 Review and amplification: refutation of the argument against the possibility of a critique ofcognition
5 The riddle of natural cognition: transcendence
6 Distinction between the two concepts of immanence and transcendence
7 The initial problem of the critique of cognition: the possibility of transcendent cognition
8 The principle of epistemological reduction


LECTUREV
1 The carrying out of the epistemological reduction: bracketing everything transcendent.
2 Theme of the investigation: the pure phenomenon.

3 The question of the "objective validity" of absolute phenomenon.
4 The impossibility of limiting ourselves to singular data: phenomenological cognition as cognitionof essences.
5 Two senses of the concept of the a priori.


LECTUREW
1 Extension of the sphere of investigation through a consideration of intentionality
2 The self-givenness of the universal: the philosophical method of the analysis of essence.
3 Critique of the interpretation of evidence as feelings: Evidence as self-givenness
4 No limitation on the sphere of genuine immanence: the theme of all self-givenness.



LECTUREX
1 The cognition of time- consciousness

2 Apprehension of essences as an evident givenness of essence: the constitution of the individual
essence and of the consciousness of universality
3 Categorical date

4 The symbolically thought as such

5 The field of research in its widest extent: The constitution of different modes of objectivity in
cognition : The problem of the correlation of cognition and the object of cognition


A The first stage of phenomenological consideration.

Firstly, as long as no fundamental principle of the possibility of knowledge has ever been settled,there could be a doubtecan a fundamental theory of knowledge be possible in the first place?f Howeverthere is some potentiality about the theory. Despite the principle of knowledge being in doubt, itfs notto say that not all knowledge is denied. 

After all, in order to establish the fundamental theory of knowledge we should first secure the sphereof certainty of more basic knowledge. To that end it is proper, to begin with, to focus onethe caseexamples which are absolutely indubitable

As things being so, we should set the idea of cogito by Descartes as our starting point. For theexistence ofecogitatiof (act of thinking) itself iseindubitablef. 

What is the ground when we sayethinking (cogitatio) is absolutely givenf? And also what is theground when we say knowledge is doubtful. I try to put forth, for the present, the paired conception ofeimmanent-transcendentf. What we call cognitive object isetranscendentf which is always accompaniedby dubitability. On the contrary,ecogitatiof (thinking), which is directly given, is an intuition with noroom for doubt. This iseimmanentf. 

Thiseimmanentf is often interpreted asereally being immanentf, but that is a mistake. When we say
that thinking iseimmanentf and directly given, the givenness does not mean theefactf of the existence ofsome object in the naturalistic sense. We need to distinguish betweenethere being given or existing something in consciousnessf, namelyeexisting immanentf and theeimmanentf in the sense ofesomething giving itself to consciousness asevidencef, namely,ethe evidence as self givennessf. The former means that it is given and exists as anobject itself. 

However, we still now donft have clear distinction between these two kinds of immanencef.(thesetwo meanenoesisf andenoemaf .)

Therefore, in the first stage, everything which reallyeinheresf is said to be indubitable. Here weshould start from this standpoint and step forward to executing phenomenological reduction, therebyput all positing of transcendent objects ineepochef. That is because we need to grasp clearly how thetranscendent appears to us as cognitive object. Inquiring the possibility of aemeetingf means exactly toclarify in what way the transcendent becomes valid to us.

The key is to grasp the essential way in which objects are given to intuition within our
consciousness. Therefore, in this method the way of thinking of natural science and of traditionalscience are completely useless.[helpless]  

We often mix-up and confuse the method of grasping essence with that of natural knowledge and
end up in failure. But the difference between them is fundamental. sWe say that phenomenological reduction means to understand all of the transcendent with theindex of zero, That is, to posit it, without recognizing its real existence or validity, merely as thevalidity of a phenomenon.t


B The second stage of phenomenological consideration

We now know that what is absolutely given are not what we calleobjectsf, but only pure
ephenomenonf which was reduced.  Neither objects of the world nor psyche oreegof in the commonsense is given in itself. Therefore, we shouldnft rely on psychology or descriptive psychology.

So we raise a root question in terms of
eHow can pure cognitive phenomenon fit in with what does
not inhere in itself?f In other words, why something which does not inhere existentially can stand as acognitive object, or why subject as the immanent does agree with object asethe transcendentf.

We may see that phenomenology could aptly solve this problem, but things do not go as easy as we
expect at first. How can purely given phenomena give rise to objects asethe transcendentfH 

In order to explain that, it is insufficient just to arrange and describe the sphere of thisephenomenonflogically. Rather, I would say the method ofeIdeationf (grasping and describing the phenomenon ofconsciousness in terms of a structure of essence) is helpful. By this method, we can grasp and organizethe objects, which are given intuitively as phenomenon, not as existential objects but as objects ofessence. Grasping in this sense, the meaning of the evidence of Cartesian cogito becomes clearer. Whatis given directly in consciousness (as intuition) is itself an object, not of existence but of essence, andthere is an assured validity and legitimacy in its givenness. 

Now we can secure the sphere ofeobjectivityf in a new sense, which is different from the
objectivity of so-called existential objects, namely, that ofeobjectivity of essence.f It will establish thesphere of bringing theeself givennessf of things, which occurs in consciousness as intuition, intoexpression; the sphere ofethe expression of essencef.

Letfs get going on the next subject. Here we see the question of two kinds ofeImmanentf
suggested above. We now understand that there is a difference betweenebeing given absolutelyf andeinhering existentiallyf. From this, the distinction of something asewhat is given absolutelyf andsomething asewhat is given existentiallyf (It means the distinction of noema and noesis. )   

As a consequence, the definition of phenomenological reduction becomes more assured, the meaning
clearer. The sphere of phenomenological exploration, which is quite different from any other scientificspheres in the past, is the sphere in which we examine the way objects are absolutely given.
Therefore, no matter how the traditional objective essential sphere is seen as doubtful, this sphere
can be held valid. This is the sphere in which we should put the matter [event] into shape, which isoccurring purely and absolutely in the field of our consciousness. Namely, theeabsolute givennessf ofthe matter in the field.

C Three stages of phenomenological consideration [investigation].

Then, letfs go on to the next subject. The consideration of essence does not merely mean generally
grasping something which actually inheres consciousness and confirming the essential relations.

Regardless of the mere outlook of it,ecogitatiof is not directly given.@Take sound for example. At firstsound seems to be given as itself. However, when we closely look at that, we find therefs a complicatedrelationship between the appearing and the appeared. 
To put it another way, a collocation of sound meansethe appearedf and is something different from
ethe appearingf (what is just now appearing). Or, we can say a continuous sound and one short sound. 
How should we thing about it?

What is described above shows us that there are two types of
eabsolute givennessf,enoesisf (the
appearing) andenoemaf (the appeared).eNoesisf means something which is really given butenoemaf isnot really given. That is, letfs say, something constituted.

To naive consciousness, or intuitional perception, phenomenon seems something which is simple
and has no distinction. Or, we would say, the distinction seems to be there as an order of objectiveexistence in the event itself. However, the phenomenological analysis tells us that, even in an intuitionwhich is seen as simple, there are various kinds of distinctions.  

When we look closely at the experience of the intuition of events with phenomenological method, wecan find that the various objects we own mean something which is given as an object or somethingconstituted. eGiven objectf is, in a sense, something which is absolutely given to consciousness but notsomething which isereallyf given. eAppearing objectf (noema) is not a part ofethe appearingf andethe appearingf does not mean itsreplacement. That two are in an absolutely inseparable relationship.

Thus, the method of phenomenological reduction discloses a wondrous correlationship ofecognitivephenomenonf andecognitive objectf in cognition. Now, we shall have the next task to reflect thatcorrelationship which represents itself in consciousness (thinking) in detail and bring it into essentialdescription. 

The objects of cognition are diverse not only in the sorts of consciousness; perception, imagination andmemory, which gives objects but also in the objectivity of objects such as conception, ideas, values.Phenomenological reduction should go after, step by step, how they are given to consciousnessaccording to the diversity of objective cognition and bring about their validity.  

In this process, we can elucidate the enigma of epistemology completely, make full scale of cognitivecriticize possible and achieve to set the most fundamental ground of all knowledge and sciences for thefirst time.



LectureT

1-1 Natural attitude of thinking and the science of natural attitude


We have so far divided science into that ofenatural attitudef andephilosophical attitudef. Letfs look
at this in detail. (Here,escience of natural attitude means positivistic natural science.)

Sciences of natural attitude are generally unaware of the question ofecognitive criticizef; in whatconditions correct cognition can be possible.@It takes the attitude of analyzing datum gained fromsensory intuition (sensory perception) by reason, cognizing various events as facts. Perception becomesthe basis of the method because we can confirm how things and events exist as it is by seeing, touchingand hearing them. We also accumulate the descriptions about the change, mutual relations and lawsof the events and gradually build up the overall picture of the natural world. 

Reasoning from directly perceived and confirmed affairs, and making a specific classification, and
after that applying the universal classification to individual events and modifying the classification inreversed operations, we always go on organizing and expanding that overall specific classification. 

However, in natural science there appear contradictions among these various kinds of
classifications and divisions in the process of those operations, and there also occur conflicts regardingthe principle and ground of the classifications (fault of reasoning, miscalculation, the failure of properclassification and so on). In this case various definitions and the ground of explications are examined,and weak ones are displaced with new ones, which should be recognized as generally valid until adoubt in another form emerges. 

Naturalistic science is advancing in this way in general, and gradually extending its domain andexactness. That is, knowledge of naturalistic science is gradually conquering the wider sphere of thereal world. We should take notice that for naturalistic science in the first place the real world is,regarding its existence, considered aseself evidentf . What is at issue here is not about its real existenceitself but about the diversity of the ways of existence, elements, change, relations and the laws whichpenetrate them. And what is more important is, such a basic method ofescience of natural attitudef likethis has become the main method of the spheres of natural science of physical things, living things,and mathematics (although in the sphere of mathematics, the main theme is not diversity orconceptions of the real world but the world ofethe idealf which is regarded as being in-itself.)  

Thus, in the sphere of the science ofenaturalistic attitudef contradictions and conflicts appear invarious aspects, but they are gradually settled in the ways seen above. In such a way the domain ofknowledge of the world is to be extended in general. It is also important that these modifications andprogress of knowledge in the sciences of natural attitude are being made in such a way as if the realworld which exists as self evident is always encouraging us to know it exactly as it is. 

1-2 Philosophical (reflective) attitude of thinking

Next, we shall compare the attitudes of naturalistic science and philosophical attitude.


In philosophical attitude the relationship between an object and its knowledge is reflectively
examined. As a result there appears a big difficulty.  On the contrary, in naturalistic way of thinking,as natural science has been accumulating its achievements step by step, the reality of objects alreadycognized and the cognitive possibility of objects yet to be cognized are seen as self-evident. Here,therefs no reason for the possibility of cognition in general to be at issue and to be reconsidered. Thecognition itself is, here, put under consideration as an object ofenatural investigationf. Cognition isregarded as a natural fact along with other events and affairs, and becomes the object of scientificresearch, for example, as the experience of organic being which cognizes, namely as a psychologicalfact. That is, howecognitionf generates and evolves inemindf, and so on.

Looking at it from another view point, cognition means the cognition of objectivity (namely, thecognition of the order of the meaning of an object). However, here again, natural way of thinkinggrasps it as the science of forms and laws in which the meaning and its order are understood. This islogic. Logic makes up, in line with that main theme, the fields of grammatology, pure logic, regulatorylogic, practical logic and so on.

However, be it psychology or logic whatever, here the question of cognition is thought as one of thenaturalistic sciences. What is important is the point that cognition meansethe cognition of objectivityf.In other words, the most central point of the question of the possibility of cognition lies in thecorrelationship between cognitive experience and the cognitive object or its meaning.


1-3 Contradictions of cognitive reflection in naturalistic views

Whatever cognition it may be, cognition is a mental experience, namely cognition ofea cognizingsubjectf. And facing the subject there corresponds something to be cognized, namelyeobjectf. Thus thequestion is:

How canesubjectf confirm the agreement between itsecognitionf andeobjectf outside of itself?

Natural way of thinking never meets this kind of question. Here, cognition and cognitive object aretacitly thought to be in agreement or ought to be in agreement. However, in philosophical thinking,there appears the very question of if the agreement is really given to us. (Descartes first raised thatquestion)For example, when we perceive something, what exactly guarantees that our perception is the rightperception of the object? Perception merely means an experience of cognitive subject in every respect.Various kinds of thinking based on that perception also mean my subjective act of thinking. How in theworld does my experience know that there exists not only my perception and my thinking but alsoobjective entity which is to be cognized?  


Should we think that only appearance is given to a cognizer and object itself can never be given tous? (like Kantian idea) Or should we think that onlyeegof exists for certain and all the rest are mereappearance. That is to say, is the standpoint of solipsism the only way which is left to us?
Or again, should we say, like Hume, that all of the objective world can be explainedpsychologically and logically it can never be verified. I would like to say none of those answers can besatisfied. In the first place, even this psychological theory of Hume, in fact, seems to go beyond theboundary of the immanent sphere ofesubjectf. Hume tried to reduceeimpressionf andeideaf into ourinner fiction, while he tacitly presupposes some real existence surpassingesubjectf, in terms ofecustomf,ehumanityf andesensory organf.

However, is there any meaning in the skeptic criticize of cognition which points out the variouscontradictions, when, in the first place, the ground of logic itself is put under question. For example, astring of biological thinking claims that human beings, accommodating to nature in the battle forsurvival, have been evolving their body and intelligence. If it is true, could we not think that logicalsystems and laws of humans could be completely different from as they are now? If that should be thecase, could we not say that cognition of humans is, in all respect, determined by a particular way andform of human cognition and intelligence, so it cannot cognize theeobjectf of the world properly? 

However, there also appears a contradiction in such an idea. That is because in the view ofeevery cognition is relativef, pointing out the contradictions of other theories and proving them asfallacies, we can see the tacit idea thatethe law of contradictionf is absolutely valid. As this exampleshows, the question of the possibility of cognition has long created a lot of riddles in every quarter.

Science of natural attitude, normally not meeting that question of cognition, thinks that everything isclear and understandable. But once facing this question there appears millions of riddles here. Thus,human reason is always exposed to the danger of falling into the various kinds of skepticisms byattempting to solve those logical contradictions.

1-4 The twofold challenges in the true science of cognitive criticize

The question of cognition has long been a stage full of contradictions like this. The first task we
should go after is a criticize one. While criticize the na?ve fallacy in which natural attitude lapses, wehave to criticize and refute, too, the various kinds of skeptic absurdity which comes from that fallacy. 

The second task is more essential and positive. That is, by clarifying the essence of cognition, to
elucidate the enigma about the meaning of cognition and itseobjectf which has long been the maintheme of modern epistemology. Furthermore the task includes, while classifying in a proper way theessences of the meaning of cognitive objects in general, therewith to clarify the meaning of the mainformality. That is to say, the forms of ontological, predicational, metaphysical and so on. ( it meansthe clear comprehension of the essential relationship among the fields of positive science, logic andphilosophy. )

Philosophical epistemology has to solve the task just mentioned above. Thereby it can be an
essential science which criticizes the naturalistic cognition of all kinds of sciences. Philosophicalepistemology, here, gains the ground of essentially interpreting the meaning of the achievements ofnatural science. That is because the question of agreement stemming from reflection on the naturalcognition has long been causing serious confusion in modern philosophy, and in consequence has beencreating the various completely fallacious ideas about cognition. These fallacious ideas haveinterpreted the cognition of natural science in various terms of materialistic, spiritualistic, dualistic,psychomonistic and positivistic ways. 

But in fact, essential epistemology of philosophy first makes it possible to separate the science of
natural thinking and philosophy, and thereby clarify that the ontology of natural attitude (how thingsexist) can be established on the basis of philosophical epistemology. 

The central theme of philosophy consists, as it were, in the science of being (entities) in an
absolute sense. It comes from the essential critique, the critique of natural attitude in each particularscience. Universal critique of cognition elucidates the essential relationship between cognizing andobject, and on that basisemetaphysicf aseessential science of beingf can be set up.  (Here, Husserluses the termemetaphysicf not in the meaning of a traditional philosophy seeking fundamentalprinciple and ultimate cause.)


1-5 True criticism of cognition as phenomenology of cognition

Disregarding any metaphysical purposes of the critique of cognition, when we confine ourselves tothe task of clarifying the essence of the problem of cognition, the science of the critique of cognitionmust beephenomenologyf of cognition and of being cognized, and it will be the first and principle part ofphenomenology. Here, phenomenology means above all a method and attitude of specific philosophicalthinking.

In contemporary philosophy, it has become almost commonplace that there must be only one
method of cognition in all science as well as philosophy. This idea derives from the starting point ofmodern philosophy in the 17th century. In fact philosophy set up its method in pursuance of the methodof exact science, above all mathematic and other mathematical natural sciences.@

And in our times it is still a prevailing idea that the method of philosophy as the primary
ontology and theory of science not only deeply relates to other sciences but also can be grounded byother sciences, in the same way in which other sciences are grounded on one another [each other?]. Infact the idea that philosophical theory of cognition can be grounded on psychology and biology was infashion for a period of time. And today there is a kind of reaction against that idea. 


1-6 The new dimension belonging to philosophy; its peculiar method in contrast to science

To be sure, in sciences of natural sort it can be the case that sciences of different kinds give theirgrounds to each other. But in the sphere of philosophy, itfs not the case. For philosophy is always inneed of a completely new starting point and an entirely new method distinguishing it in principle fromnatural science because philosophy should include the fundamental science of the critique of cognitionabove mentioned. And that new method must be the one distinguishing itself from the science ofnatural sort. For that very reason philosophy starting from the essential critique of cognition cannotmake use of the various methods and the achievements of natural science, rather has to ignore all ofthem.

For the present, we shall consider the following point. 

Even in skeptical critique of cognition prior to essential philosophical critique of cognition, various
kinds of scientific methods of natural sort have been in question of its validity. Here, since not onlyscientific views but also in particular the accomplishments of exact science (e.g. mathematics) arethought doubtful as far as the agreement of subject and object is concerned, they cannot be the groundof the fundamental reflection of the question of cognition. Therefore the question of how our cognitionsubject can reach the object is left over as that which an answer cannot be figured out in a positiveway.

There appears a new question of how the right method of cognition, the validity of cognition canbe assured or how the right one and the fallacious one can be distinguished as unsolvable. Along withthat there also appears the difficult question of the cognitive objectivity in itself. Whether it is possibleor not that the object ever be cognized? Or, even if it has not been and never will cognized, can it havethe right to be cognized in principle, namely can it be perceived, represented and described in someway? 

We should know that by using the cognitive presuppositions based on the natural cognitions thereis no avail to solve the question of cognition above seen. Once the agreement of subject and object isput under question, as far as the method of natural science is based on the presupposition of theagreement, it is very clear that we cannot extract the fundamental views from this sphere to solve thatquestion. The same are the cases of exact mathematics and mathematical natural sciences. 

It is then clear that there can be no such talk as that philosophy has to model itself after the basicmethod and the cognitive idea which exact science has accumulated, and succeed and complete itmethodologically. Once again, for the reason mentioned above philosophy has to stand on acompletely new dimension in contrast to every method of cognition of natural sort. Or, it has to once setup itself as an entirely contradictive method to that of the sciences of natural sort. Those who canunderstand the significance of the critique of cognition and the difficulty of this task must support thisview.


LectureU

2-1 Treating questionable: every knowing

Now, our task is the essential critique of cognition. Before starting it, what we should keep in mind
is we have to set aside various cognitive views and ideas which so far human beings have found.

Then where should we set the starting point? The aim of the science of the critique of cognition lies
in elucidatingethe essence of cognitionf, to be more precise, ascertaining how to define the conceptionsthe relationship of cognition and its objectivity, the trueness, validity and agreement of cognition. 
eThe suspension of judgment-epochef does not mean to doubt all of the traditional human knowledge,therefore even cognition of the critique of cognition, and after all, to persist to the attitude of doubt tothe end. Rather, as long as the science of the critique of cognition has to thoroughly examine thepresupposition of traditional cognition, it should set up the first point of its departure all by itselfwithout relying on any established views and authorities of the world knowledge. 

The first cognition which is a starting point, therefore, must be something which is completely immunefrom the implicit doubtfulness (unclearness)@with which all the traditional cognition is necessarilyaccompanied. The unclearness of cognition is deeply related to the question of in what relationshipan existence being cognized and the existenceein-itselff is. That is the very reason that we cannotstart from any premises of traditional cognition about the existence. 

What we need to do is, nevertheless, to find something that can be denied by no one as an absolutegivenness and indubitable, and to start from this point.    


2-2 Reaching the ground of absolute certainty in pursuance of Descartesf method of doubt.

Descartes tried the similar attempt regarding the starting point of philosophical thinking. He claimedthat after doubting all of existence, the existence ofeIf which is doubting everything is left as absolutelyindubitable at the end.@It is no less the case with the conception ofecogitatiof (intentionality ofconsciousness). Various things I perceive, represent, judge and value and here I know that thereappear various kinds of uncertainty, doubt and error. Nevertheless, I am also clearly aware that theexisting perceptions of this uncertainty, doubt and error are absolutely indubitable. In a similar way,in the cases of representation and judgment, even the judgment is obscure or uncertain, the fact thatnow I have the act of that judgment is absolutely and certainly given to us.

Descartesf considerations were made for other purposes. But we can use them here, with somemodifications. The key point is that the act of thinking, which Ifm now executing, of perception,imagination, judgment and valuation is, insofar as I am reflecting and directly receiving them with mypure intuition,eabsolutely givenf to me.

For example, I can speak about, in a vague fashion, my own perception, imagination, experience,judgment and so on; but then, when I reflect on them with clear awareness, all that is said to be givenspeaking about in a vague fashion itselfimmediately becomesean absolutely given experiencef.
That is the case with not only actual perception but also memory or imagination of some perception. Inthe latter, the perception is given, not as a vivid present but as a perception which is recalled orimagined.


Now, I have put the act of perception and the act of reflection of imagination on the same level; butwe should start, in pursuance of Descartes, with the most basic and the absolute givenness ofperception.

2-3 The sphere of the things that are absolutely given.


We can put the above mentioned more briefly that every mental process is not only experienced butreflectively apprehended as the object of pureeseeingf and pure apprehension (under the clearawareness); and here the mental process is said to be absolutely given to us. (as the absolutegivenness)

On reflection of our own experience, we can think and see what kind of experience it is, whatrelationship it has with other experiences, in what way it is given and so on. That thinking andjudgment is made in such a way that it always goes back to the absoluteness of ongoing experiencenow being reflected.

For instance, having a mental process of a perception, I caneseef or inspect the perception itselfreflectively, and grasp itsegivennessf, intrinsic character, and meaning. (In IDEAS, Husserl executedthis phenomenological reflection in particular detail and extracted the conceptions and structures ofvivid evidence, adumbration, actual-potential, halo of background intuition, cogitatio-cogitatum,immanence-transcendence and so on.) Not only the mental process of a perception but also someespecific formation of thinkingf(conceptual meaning designated by objects) is, as long as I ameseeingf that kind of object reflectively,absolutely given to me.

When we
eseef our own perception, imagination, judgment and thinking reflectively, they are
immediately and absolutely given to us. For that reason we can discern the acts of perception,imagination, judgment and thinking as different ones, and give words to their characteristics in adistinctive way (or extract the essences of them). Otherwise, there would be nothing to be absolutelygiven to us.

Thus, as seen above, we have now defined the sphere ofethe absolute givennessf. And this must bethe starting point of the science of the critique of cognition. The essential science of the critique ofcognition doesnft reduce the fact of cognition into psychological fact, and doesnft decide the naturalconditions of the possibility of cognition. What we should take notice again is that the critical science ofcognition is not the science of defining the fact of cognition as the positivistic science but that ofelucidating theeessencef of cognition.


2-4 Review and amplification: refutation of the argument against the possibility of a critique ofcognition

Letfs confirm what has been observed above. The science of natural sort doesnft worry about theserious problem of epistemology, as it has a strong confidence of the agreement between cognition(subject) and its correlate (object). However, once finding the difficulty in the form of the variousconflicts of cognition and theories, it becomes aware that it has no method to deal with this problem.Since the science of natural sort presupposes the agreement of subject-object from the outset, it has noway out of this difficulty.

That is the very reason that philosophical science of the critique of cognition is prerequisite. Thepossibility ofemetaphysicsf seeking the meaning and essence of being lies in how the science of thecritique of cognition will go. It is clear, however, that critique of cognition cannot make use of anyestablished achievement of the science of natural sort, because the critique put the basic ground of thescience of natural sort in question. Then, how can the critical science of cognition set up its startingpoint from the position of regarding every traditional view as no avail? 

I have already suggested that the critical science of cognition can start from its own particular
cognition without any ground of traditional knowledge. To put it differently, I showed the firstcognition which is not involved in the traditional riddle of cognition as a sphere to be calledeevidence ofcogitatiof which is absolutely clear and indubitable. Again, I showed the first cognition as such that amental process reflectivelyeseenf is, whatever kind of process it may be, to be regarded as aneabsolutegivenness; or, the immanence of cognition is to be seen something absolute no one can doubt.f 

I shall try to argue that the
eimmanence of cognitionf, immune to the exhaustive doubt of
skepticism, must be the most basic and necessary starting point of cognition in general, and thereforethat it is completely nonsensical for the starting point of the critique of cognition to rely on thetraditional sphere of theetranscendentf science such as psychology.

In connection with that I would like to touch on the logic: as long as all cognition is riddle and it
has no absolute ground, the cognition which is to be the starting point of the critique of cognitioncannot be exempt from the thoroughgoing doubt. This is clearly a deceptive claim. It is from the vaguegeneralization of the wording.eCognition in general is in questionf does not mean that all cognitionmust be denied. [ every question/ all the questions/ all (of the) questions/ all questions must bedenied ?]
Rather, there just appears an important insoluble riddle. The riddle is, I showed at first, of the
eagreement of subject and objectf: how can I confirm that my cognition agrees its object, as long as noone can go beyond onefs subjectcognition.


However, if I find an absolutely assured cognition where no doubt can ever stand, I can make it thefirst step of the science of the critique of cognition. And you shall see now thatethe evidence ofimmanent cognitionf is no less that first cognition.


2-5 The riddle of natural cognition: transcendence


The most central riddle of the question of the possibility of cognition lies in, in a word,ethe
transcendence of cognitionf. And what all of the sciences of natural sort regard as truth is the positingof transcendent object. They think of the posited transcendent as objective existence, and claim thattheir cognition agrees the object. We should reexamine that.



2-6 Distinction between the two concepts of immanence and transcendence

Now I came up with the wordetranscendencef, but the word can be taken by twofold meaning.


The
first means that cognitive object is not containedegenuinelyf in the act of cognition in the mentalprocess. Here, the point of epistemological question isehow can the mental process transcend itself?fOr, how can the mental process transcend itself and constitute object?

I said the first meaning of
etranscendencef denotesecognitive object is not genuinely given in themental processf. In contrast to that, the second meaning denotes that: cognition transcends what is inthe true sense given to consciousnessf. Again, the first transcendence just means cognition which isnot genuinely given in consciousness. The second means cognition which transcends what is given asabsolutely clear givenness. Differently speaking, the firsteimmanencef means what is genuinelycontained (given) in consciousness, the secondeabsolutely clear givennessf which is directly given toconsciousness.

Therefore, as to the question of cognition, in the former case, how can the mental process so to speak
transcend itself , the latter, how can cognition posit something as existing which is not directly andtruly given in it?


Before we develop the essential critique, the relationship between immanence and transcendence isnot clearly distinguished. As a result, one who raises the first questionehow can the mental processtranscend itself and cognize something that is genuinely given?f, at the same time implicitly raises orincludes in it the second questionehow can cognition create the cognition which transcends theabsolutely clear givenness?fThat is to say, here, he puts [makes] a tacit presumption: that which isegenuinelyf contained in theact of cognition is the only thing which is absolutely given. Therefore, he seems to be doubtful about allcognition which is formed as transcendence; but the presumption is a mistake.


2-7 The initial problem of the critique of cognition: the possibility of transcendent cognition

The conception ofetranscendencef is construed in either of two senses mentioned above or in anambiguous way; but the question ofetranscendencef is the central theme of the critique of cognition orthe very entrance of the universal science of the critique of cognition. 

Besides, this question clearly shows why the transcendent science, the objective sciences cannot be
used for the problem of the critique of cognition. The core of the problem of cognition lies in that: thecognition obtained by the objective sciences means the cognition as transcendence but here it isimpossible for the transcendent cognition to grasp how it reaches the object as such or how it knowsitself reaching the object.

Still someone might say: surely there
fs such a riddle in the problem of cognition, but even when we
cannot exactly tell how the agreement of subject and object can be possible it is quite certain thatnatural science has long cognized the natural world as an objective fact. No man with reason willdoubt it, the real existence of the world. The question of the agreement of subject and object is arhetorical question fabricated by skeptics.

Then we should answer him as follows: no matter how steadfast confidence the objective science
may have, as the cognition is that of transcendent it is impossible for the cognition to answer theproblem of the critique of cognition. Therefore the objective science cannot be the foundation ofepistemology in the true sense.

Once again, the central question of epistemology (the critique of cognition) lies in that our cognition
means, in every respect,etranscendencef and that in epistemologyehow can transcendent cognition bepossiblef is itself a riddle and unsolved. The logic of objective sciences claims: surely it is a riddle butthe objective cognition has been acquired in practice therefore the objective cognition is possible.However we must say the core of the problem remains unsolved here. 

It is very clear what the objective science is lacking. When the objective science maintains it surely
cognizesethe transcendentf that meanseobjectf itself; but in fact, the object is nothing else than thatwhich is grasped within itsesubjectf. As the objective science cannot understand the structural essenceof cognition, the core of this problem is unclear to it.Again, putting them in order, the central points are the following: firstly, cognition and the objectare quite different. Secondly, as the former is directly given to us the latter is not. Thirdly, neverthelessthe two items (cognitionsubject and the correlateobject) must agree. How can we understand thispossibility? 

The answer is that if we directly
eseef the essential relationship between cognition (subject) and
what is cognized (object), we can understand that. Objective sciences donft think like that ratherimagine being able to understand the relationship frometranscendencef which is acquired. But, ofcourse it is impossible.

If objective sciences accept the idea I mentioned above, they understand the difficulty in the
question of the agreement of subject and object, and recognize theireobjective cognitionf as somethingetranscendentf. Then, the question changes fromehow can objective cognition be possible?f toewhy do wecome to think of somethingetranscendentf as objective cognition?f. That is the path Hume took.

However, setting Humefs question aside, we go on to the following consideration to clarify thestructure of the question above seen.

A man who has inherently no sense of hearing can understand in his mind that there exists
excellent music by means of the combination of sounds and harmony, but not how the combination ofsounds makes harmony and music. This is because even if he hasethe howf in his knowledge he doesnfthave it in his directeseeingf or in the form of immediate givenness. In this case his knowledge of soundand music is the transcendent, andethe howf meanseabsolute givennessf.  

Our main task lies in elucidating the essence of the relationship between thateabsolute givennessf
andetranscendencef. Although objective sciences think it possible to cognize the relationship just frometranscendencef which is acquired with no absolute givenness at all, itfs completely impossible.

I repeatedly say that on this account it is totally negative to solve the essence of the problem of
cognition with knowledge of objective science. In order to solve the problem there can be no way otherthan starting from a completely new idea, a fundamentally different view from the traditional one.

2-8 The principle of epistemological reduction

I would like to call a totally new ideaeepistemological reductionf.What we have to notice is that to investigate the problem further we should be aware of its being notabout the sphere of facts but about that of the essence of consciousness. That is why theepistemological reduction is necessary. ( IneIdeasf the term is changed into that ofephenomenological reductionf oretranscendental reductionf)eEpistemological reductionf means, in brief, to put the index of exclusion, indifference and nullity onknowledge as transcendence, or that of suspending the judgment the authenticity of that knowledge.

In this sphere of essential theory they often makeemetabasisf to the other classes. (metabasis
Greek cctransition to other classes. In Husserl, confusing the different logics.) That is, they oftenmix up and confuse the spheres of the actual and ideal, and the real and the essential. This is the mainreason for the fallacy in the essential science of the critique of cognition. Although what matters iscognizing the immanent essence of consciousness in the essential theory of cognition, they take it forcognizing the objective fact, and go to nowhere. 


LectureV

3-1 The carrying out of the epistemological reduction: bracketing everything transcendent.

By considerations we have seen above, it has become clear what is to be used and not used for the grounding of the essential theory of the critique of cognition. We cannot make use of the knowledge of the traditional objective sciences, rather settle the starting point of it only in the whole sphere of ecogitationesf, namely that of the act of consciousness or of immanence of consciousness. For there existseabsolute givennessf in this sphere. We can call the sphereepure phenomenonf, which are events occurring in our consciousness in such a way that everyone has to recognize the certainty.

Epistemological reduction that I have already mentioned means a method to extract the essence of thise pure phenomenonf, thereby we prevent ourselves from confusing theeevidence of cogitatiof itself (absolute givenness in consciousness) with theeevidence of cogitatio of thinking existence (sum cogitans). That is to say, we have to make clear distinction between phenomenological eIf and psychologicaleIf, the former of which we should callepure phenomenonf. OfepsychologicaleIf, we sayeI think therefore I amf or we think thatewith thinkingeIf there exist my judgment, cognition, emotion and so onf. To put it another way, here the various acts of cogito in consciousness are thought to be things which are objectively and actually existent in objective time.

fIf,emy consciousnessf andethe act of my consciousnessf are altogether psychological facts. Or we should call it, phenomenologically, the cognition already grasped asetranscendencef. As long as the essential theory of the critique of cognition has the main task of elucidation, the essential relationship betweenetranscendencef andeimmanencef, the notion ofemy mindf,emy consciousnessf as a psychological fact must be bracketed or parenthesized in advance.

3-2@Theme of investigation: The pure phenomenon

Now we have clearly seen the reason for the suspension of judgment of all kinds of transcendent knowledge. Once taking the view point ofereductionf, eveneselff,eIf, or my perception which is thought as objectively existent in the world meansetranscendencef, namely a conviction constituted. The phenomenological view point of the critique of cognition stops the self-evident presupposition of the objective world that means naturaletranscendencef (ofeIf and the objective world), therefore how it [etranscendencef] is constituted must be the very object of philosophical investigation. 

Assuming phenomenological attitude, namely suspending the presupposition of the certainty of objective existence and removing anyedoxaf, theneseeingf inner essence of consciousness in terms of ewhat is given as it is in itselff. That means we extract how the various kinds of objective cognition are constituted in the sphere of pure phenomenon, the immanence of consciousness. We call that point of viewephenomenological reductionf (Tp{mF)

However, if we want not to run aground on this shore and to gain a firm foothold on land, we should take new steps and have more consideration because there are a lot of difficulties and puzzles hidden behind. What we have observed above is the consideration taken from the view point of the critique of cognition, which, if properly applied, holds for every kind of phenomenon beyond the mere framework of the critique of cognition.

The philosophical ground on this problem that I have so far set up is securing the sphere of eabsolute givennessf and starting from this point. But there must appear doubt about the certainty of this foothold or the possibility of, if only to a slight degree, containing not absolute givenness. In order to clear the doubt we must confine the problem in the sphere ofepure phenomenonf, namely the sphere of the seeing ofeabsolute givennessf or the sphere ofepure consciousnessf.

Once more, we cannot start frometranscendencef. Since objective cognition isetranscendencef, there is no object actually given in our consciousness correspondent to the cognition. However, as long as we are in fact building up a lot of objective cognition, be it scientific knowledge or natural one, what matters lies in theetranscendence of cognitionf, namelyehow does objective cognition having no absolute givenness form itself as a validity (or conviction)?f I have to say that with regard to the validity ofeobjective cognitionf, there must occur something, within the sphere ofepure phenomenonf, correspond to the cognition. 
 sreaching the object of this relation to transcendent things, still it has something which can be grasped in the pure phenomenont

Thus, we come to understand in every point that the sphere ofepure phenomenonf oreimmanence is the fundamental sphere for the problem of cognition. Cognition meansetranscendencef. (a conviction or faith which was constituted according to the conditions in consciousness) It is decisive to understand the essence of structure of consciousness for elucidating the ground of the serious confusion or conflict in the scientific theories. Therefore, therefs no other correct starting point thanepure phenomenonf, which is the fundamental sphere whereeabsolute givennessf is actually given andetranscendencef as such is currently constituted.

3-3@The pure phenomenon. The question of theeobjective validityf of the absolute phenomenon.


Thus, here, phenomenology is aimed at the essential theory ofepure phenomenonf or ofepure cognition. However, there, we are also faced with a difficulty. In the first place,edoes not all science lead to the establishing of objects existing in themselves, i.e., to transcendent object?f ( does not any science seek to confirm the real existence of the cognitive object, and thence, to gain the right knowledge of the object?) If that should be the case, does the confirmation of the objectivity of the cognitive object belong to the essence of science, on which the universal validity of science should be founded? 

Then, how about the problem in the sphere ofepure phenomenologyf? Our field of investigation is quite different from that of common science. That is, the unique field of, so to speak,eHeraclitian flux of phenomenaf; oreever-fluxing consciousness. How can we describe that field?

Obviously, it exists, and I can say: this here! , this phenomenon includes the part of that phenomenon; this is connected to that, or this influxes into that. However, these sayings are, if valid, only the truth in subject. Phenomenological the field ofepure phenomenonf in phenomenology is inherently that of subject. As long as the universal cognition must be seen aseobjectivef, how can knowledge gained in this field be qualified aseobjectivef andeuniversalf?

We may recall the distinction of perceptual judgment and empirical judgment by Kant. ( In Kant, sensation( Sinnlichkeit) is in charge of perceptual intuition and understanding(Verstand) integrates it into conceptual judgment.) Although the attempt of grasping the constitution of etranscendencef from the field ofepure phenomenonf is similar to Kantian attempt, therefs no idea of ephenomenological reductionf in Kant. Therefore, he couldnft fully get over theepsychological attitudef we defined.

In any event, what is needed here is to seek how events within subject can be an
objectively valid judgment. Even in the case of phenomenology if it is called science, we tend to think there must be the ground of objective validity.

The critical question, here, is: does not objectivity carry transcendence with it? ; does all that we call objective cognition transcend, with no exception, the absolute certainty of immanence of consciousness? ; what in the world doesetranscendencef mean?, and so on. 

Phenomenology, through epistemological reduction, excludes transcendental presupposition, in order to confirm the possibility of objective cognition. However, whatever method or right does phenomenology have to confirm the objectivity of cognitive object? Phenomenology claims that it executes the suspension of judgment ofetranscendent existencef to confirm the validity of objective cognition; but as long aseobjectivity carries transcendence with itf, in what way can phenomenology confirm the ground of the objectivity of cognition? There seems a vicious circle which makes the ground of phenomenology itself impossible.

However, this circle is a spurious one. We have already seen that there are two sets of the distinction ofeimmanencef andetranscendencef, in which the key to break the difficulty lay hidden.

Descartes, after demonstrating theeevidence of cogitof (I think therefore I am), questioned what gives him the essential ground of it, then answered: clear and evident perception is that. We now understand that significance more than Descartes. That is, in the sphere of cogitatioeabsolute givennessf is given. Although we should reserve judgment in respect to the proof of God and the honesty of Him, we can carry his idea ofeabsolute groundf further.

It follows that: true we have confirmed the givenness ofepure cogitatiof (epure consciousnessf or eimmanencef) as indubitable, but we cannot recognize the existence of outer things in external perception.

That means it is impossible for us to understandehow perception can reach the transcendencef; but we understand, on the other hand,ehow perception can reach the immanentf through pure and immanent reflection. That is because we can directly and absolutely grasp what we are now perceiving andeseeingf in phenomenological reflection,.

As a whole, it is not meaningless to inquire about whether or not our subjective cognition reaches itseobject.e; but it is meaningless, whileeseeingf what is currently given to our immanence, to doubt it.

That is to say, immanent intuition which is given to us in each case is always the most fundamental ground of oureworld experiencef, and also the most basiceabsolute evidencef on which all of our knowledge stands.

On the contrary, intention or conviction of the transcendence is not really given in principle, therefore it has a necessary possibility ofenot itf. Nevertheless, naturally, a lot of kinds of objective cognition stand as valid in fact; but this is of no help to refute our view point in the critique of cognition.


3-4 The impossibility of limiting ourselves to singular data; phenomenological cognition as cognition ofessence

Now, I would like to propose one important question: doeseabsolute self givennessf(absolute givenness) or absolute evidence which we have seen appear only in an individual intuition of thiseDaf? Or is it not given as another givenness, namely as a certain kind of universality(conception, ideal)? 


No matter how important the setting up ofeabsolute givennessf in the act of consciousness is, if we confine it just to particular intuitions (perception, memory, imagination, emotion and so on), they are put in danger of losing their validity. We can say thatecogitatiof (perception, memory or emotion) which is now existing to me is absolutely given. However, it does not mean the proposition:eonly givenness of reduced phenomenon as such is absolute givennessf.

 
Considering the whole situation, it is obvious that when we make a proposition as a judgment in
respect to the act of consciousness (cogitationes) which is phenomenologically reflected, the judgment has already gone beyond the immediacy of the act of consciousness. For example we may say that: this judgment represents this or that phenomenon of perception or imagination; this perception contains this or that aspect, color content, etc. It is the case of a logical predication, therefore there appears noteabsolute givennessf itself but something beyond absolute givenness through particular [individual] intuition.

3-5 Ambiguity of the conception ofea priorif.

Thus, what should be focused on is the new cognition:enot only particulars, but also universals, universal objects, and universal states of affairsf can beeabsolute self givennessf. This cognition is of decisive importance for the possibility of phenomenology.

For the central theme of phenomenology inherently [intrinsically] lies ineanalysis of essencef or einvestigation into essencef (In phenomenology essence means, more generally,emeaningf or existence of the ideal). As we have seen, phenomenology starts from the critique of cognition; but its most important task is setting up the science for elucidating the possibility of cognition or of value. In this respect, phenomenology must be regarded as the science of the general investigation ofeessencef. 

Analysis of essence denotesegeneral analysisf (or analysis of speciesf), namely, cognition of essence means that of the universal or that of universal objects. To put it another way, the main sphere of phenomenology is the science of essence of how the various kinds of the universal are given, and how they acquire the validity. Cognition ofea priorif means the science of essence which is directed to the essence of the universal and is elicited only from pure intuition of the universal. Here we see the most legitimate conception ofea priorif.

When we extend the critique of cognition no only to the critique of theoretic reason but also to that
of practical reason, in addition to this firstea priorif, the objective includesea priorif in the second sense. That is, the new horizon of a science will appear which seeks the essential structure of higher meanings and ideals such as logic, ethics or theory of value. They are generally grounded on the basic theory ofeself givennessf.


Lecture W@ (Condense )

4-1 Extension of the sphere of investigation through a consideration of intentionality

<Summary>
What is most important to grasp the essence of cognition is to abandon the presupposition that an eobjecte just exists, to consider the sphere of esubject=consciousnessf alone and directly observe through inner reflection what is taking place within it. What matters here is however not to observe the events as they are, but to describe, as an essential relation of consciousness, how eknowledge or cognitionf develops, that is, how etranscendencef (validity=belief) is constituted by eimmanencef.

We have already seen what a egenuine (reall)f element is in inner consciousness. We can also find here a structure of a egenuine element (cogitatio) vs. intentional objectivity (cogitatum). It is crucial to fully analyze and comprehend the relationship between the two moments, because by so doing one is able to comprehend the eessential structuref of knowledge.

This phenomenological investigation is therefore by no means a mere description of individual consciousness events which come and go in the flux of experience of consciousness. We need to make sure that what matters@is instead an examination of gessential beingsh emerging in there, that is, what kind of meaning or universal thing or structure can be uncovered there.



4-2 The self-givenness of the universal: the philosophical method of the analysis of essence.

<Summary>
The euniversalf, i.e., such elements as emeaningf, econceptf and eideaf necessarily emerges in our cognition. Could it be an eabsolute givennessf in the same sense as ecogitatiof (particular perception)?

It seems difficult to exactly define that, unlike particular eseeingf (perception), it can be efound in realityf in consciousness.  Could we say then that anything like emeaningf or econceptf is in fact something  etranscendentf  instead of really existing in inner consciousness. 


I would answer to this question as follows: we might say that the euniversalf or emeaningf is of transcendent nature in the sense that they are not genuine elements in consciousness.  What is essential for our investigation is however what can be identified as eabsolute givennessf, rather than whether or not it is egenuinef. The euniversalf is certainly not a egenuinef element, but from my point of view, it is still given to consciousness as an eabsolute givennessf. Let us take an example.


I am now looking at a piece of red paper. Let us observe this consciousness by way of inner reflection. When we look at it very carefully, the red paper is not uniformly eredf over the entire sheet, but has parts with different shades of redness. Yet I abstract the diverse shades of red and perceive it as a piece of ered paperf. I intuitively see here the emeaningf of red, or ered in generalf as a color of the object. This ered in generalf is the guniversalh mentioned above, that is, an intuition or seeing egiven as a meaningf. It is nothing other than eabsolute givennessf originally given to my consciousness.

Let us see another example. Suppose that I am looking at a piece of dark red paper and another piece of light red paper. I then observe that two red colors are not the same, but they are still the same eredf as a color. When I say here eeither of them is redf, I observe one egeneralf thing or emeaningf. This is something that can be named an eabsolute givennessf.

The reason is as follows. This intuitive observation: gthis is a piece of red paperh or geither of them is redh (eseeing of meaningf, or eidetic seeing in Husserlfs gIdeas ch) is, just like the perceptive seeing of red color itself, an eoriginal intuitionf which must be accepted as it is, as further questions like gwhat does this red mean, or what is its essence? make no sense at all.

The examples mentioned above are quite simple, and our actual eknowledgef has more complicated and diverse phases. Accordingly, further in-depth examination will be required to describe the essential structure in its entirety of ecognitionf in general.

No matter how complex studies it may require, however, we should remember that the most basic principle is still the phenomenological eanalysis of essencef , by which we directly observe inner consciousness, as discussed above.

All things considered, the method of ephenomenological reductionf (=method of ideation), whose examples have been given above, is the fundamental method of phenomenology, which alone should enable essential critiques of knowledge and reason. Only through this essential critique of knowledge, we shall be able to step into the most intrinsic theme of philosophy (Husserl hereby suggests the science of essence).



4-3. Critique of the interpretation of evidence as feelings: Evidence as self-givenness:  

<Summary>
 As has been seen above, seeing the euniversalf or emeaningf is also an eabsolute givennessf. Let us call it by the name of eevidencef.

Let us define eevidence for the time being as a gconsciousness that intuitively sees or observes its own self and directly and fully grasps it as well, which is truly a full and complete self-givennessh. (can be understood as a consciousness where live emeaningf emerges in a fulfilling way).

Philosophical empiricists once argued in their attempt to endorse esomething absolutely evidentf in consciousness that live efeelingsf give us the notion of evidence. Phenomenological inner reflection however tells us immediately that this is not a true-to-essence explanation. 

Let us see the following example. As for the judgment 2 x 2 =4, I can vaguely conjure it up in the form of symbolic representation,   or I can conduct an evident and positive judgment saying two times  two are four. Both are logically the same ejudgmentsf, but their essence is largely distinct from each other.

The theory of evidence as feelings mentioned above is unable to adequately explain the difference between the two judgments. From the phenomenological point of view, the fact is that the latter judgment explicitly observes the mathematical logic of 2x2=4, making certain of and fulfilling its validity.
In the former case, by contrast, I just figure the equation with a mere empty intention.

Let us see another example. While I one time have a live and vivid perception of a red-colored object, on another I vaguely think of some ered colorf. Here again, the essential matter is not in the difference in feelings. Phenomenologically, we can explain this in the way that, while ered colorf is explicitly given to consciousness as a particular perceptive observation in the former case, only its image (imaginary presentation) is given in the latter case.  The way an object is egivenf is essentially different between the two cases, and the intensity of feelings is merely the result of this difference.

In other words, the way an eeventf (object) gives itself in consciousness, that is, eself-givennnessf of an object determines its eevidencef. 


 Now it should be clear to everyone that whether or not an event is eevidentf depends on its eself-givennessf (the way it gives itself), but not on the feelings hanging around.


  Incidentally, the question we have been discussing is that the euniversalf or emeaningf is given to us as a live and direct egivennessf and as an eevidencef. Also, we have made sure just above that the euniversalf (such as meaning, concept and idea) may have absolute eevidencef as much as particular seeing. This is our conclusion for the time being.



4-4 No limitation on the sphere of genuine immanence: the theme of all self-givenness.

<Summary>
We have seen that not only particular seeing but also the eseeing of meaningf has also absolute evidence. Let us further examine what it signifies.


 Suppose an example as follows. On the one hand I can talk about the feature of ered colorf while actually looking at a red apple. On the other, I am able to talk about how I feel about the red color of an apple without looking at the real apple. It means that I have here several kinds of eseeing or intuitionh. They are itemized as follows.

1. Direct perceptive intuition of  ered colorf
2. Intuition to extract emeaningf from the direct intuition of ered colorf (intuition of intuition)
3.  Intuition of ered colorf imagined
4. Intuition of this imaginary intuition (i.e. extracting the essence of red color from the eperception of red colorf imagined


All of these intuitions can be referred to as eabsolute self-givenness.


Skeptics may now refute that these are all eself-givennessf. They will probably argue that the tuitions 2 and 4, which are to extract egeneral meaningf are our later addition and could not be named self-givenness.


Then let us see what will happen if they are not eself-givennessf. The four intuitions listed above are all indispensable for ascertaining the existence of things. Lacking any one of them, we are unable to make sure of even simple being of things. Since they are such intuitions that are by no means arbitrarily given, that indisputably come from outside, we are able to have knowledge or certainty of things without any trouble. Anyway, we no doubt have criteria for distinguishing between absolute givenness and nothing like that in our immanence. If not, we could not differentiate at all between erealf and enot realf, and between ebeingf and enon-being.

  
Skeptics deny certainty altogether, but in fact, they are not suspicious about being of things or the world. They do not try to think about the reason for it (certainty of being of the world), and only assert that there is no agreement between subject and object logically.



Therefore, there is no use lecturing skeptics any longer. For no one is able to deprive skeptics of a freedom to say they do not see what they actually see. 

In any event, we can do nothing other than maintaini the notion of eabsolute self-givenessf as an essential ground for validity of knowledge.

Our next important task is now to essentially identify the scope of what we can call eabsolute self-givennessf. ( gThen the question arises as to how far it extends and as to the extent to which, and the sense in which, it ties itself down to the sphere of cogitationes j and the universals which are abstracted from them.h Lecure IV of the gIdea ch)


We have already made certain that not only particular eseeingf but also the euniversalf seeing or seeing of emeaningf are eself-givennessf. Since this euniversalf has extremely diverse phases and forms, it is never too easy to make clear distinction in a scientific way.

Unless we have a thoroughgoing understanding of the essence of the method of ephenomenological reductionf, we shall necessarily misjudge the extent of evidence and fall into errors of taking transcendent for eimmanentf.

The method is basically summarized as follows.


1.  Holding fast to the notion of eabsolute self-givennessf
2.   Inner reflecting and delineating direct eseeingf and @@@
@@observing egenericf in there

3.  Not only that, knowing there are more objectivities, which can all be divided by egivennessf (the way an event is given), and observing, describing and appropriately classifying the essence of this givenness.


LECTUREX

5-1 The cognition of time- consciousness

5-2 Apprehension of essences as an evident givenness of essence: the constitution of the individualessence and of the consciousness of universality

5-3 Categorical date

5-4 The symbolically thought as such

5-5 The field of research in its widest extent: The constitution of different modes of objectivity incognition : The problem of the correlation of cognition and the object of cognition

eThe Idea of Phenomenologyf
Complete Decoding by S. TAKEDA


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